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This paper examines the determinants of new pharmaceutical launches since 1980 in the G7 nations using 
discrete-time hazard models.  Despite the obvious incentive to amortize the large sunk costs of drug 
development over many markets, entry occurs in only 4% of the opportunities.  The results indicate that 
firm characteristics, such as domestic status and experience in the local market, are important in explaining 
product launches in addition to market characteristics.  Also, the interaction between the innovating firm 
and target country is a critical component of profitability.  New drugs are 1.5 times more likely to be 
launched in markets that share a border or a language of a drug company’s country of headquarters, even 
for multinational firms.  The effect of competition depends on the characteristics of both the potential 
entrant and the incumbents: domestic entrants prefer to compete with domestic incumbents.  Although this 
is an industry with the potential for ubiquitous licensing and low transportation costs, the specific match 
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This paper examines the influences of market structure, firm and product characteristics on 
the launch of new drugs in the largest pharmaceutical markets, the G7 nations.  Despite the 
incentives to amortize large and sunk development costs over many markets, only one-third of the 
prescription pharmaceuticals sold in one of these countries (the US, Japan, Germany, France, 
Italy, the UK, and Canada) are also marketed in the other six.  Economic theory suggests that 
entry is a function of market size, the level of competition, and the fixed costs associated with 
product launch.  Research in strategic management suggests that firms are heterogeneous: some 
are better suited to a particular market than others.  Joint testing of economic and strategic 
hypotheses is rare, largely because it requires a setting with a clear set of potential entrants and 
separate markets.  Disentangling these various effects is an empirical challenge, but one for which 
this setting is ideal.  An identical product is launched (or not launched) in different markets, 
yielding three sources of variance to exploit: variation across countries, variation across 
therapeutic classes, and changes over time. 
Besides the obvious effects on available medical treatments in a country, there are a number 
of reasons why the entry patterns of new pharmaceuticals are important.  Understanding them 
may provide insights into the diffusion of other new technologies, particularly those characterized 
by large development costs, relatively low marginal or transportation costs, and that are 
susceptible to creative destruction by subsequent innovators.  Theories on entry suggest that some 
features of this industry will result in “too little” entry in equilibrium.  In addition, identifying the 
sources of competitive advantage in this industry has implications for industry structure and, 
perhaps, the regulation of entry within a country, as well as managerial decisions such as the 
choice of a licensing partner. 
My main finding is that firm-level characteristics and their interaction with other variables are 
at least as important in understanding competition as the “usual suspects” like market size and 
entry barriers.  In particular, market characteristics alone correctly predict entry for only about 
30% of the sample.  Including firm characteristics improves this prediction substantially.  These 
firm variables affect entry in several ways.  First, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in firms’ 
cost of entry, related to country-of-origin, size, and experience.  Second, these costs vary within a 
firm across markets; i.e., the interaction of firm and market characteristics matters.  Similarities 
between the country of headquarters and the target country, such as a shared border or language, 
greatly increase the likelihood of product launch.  Finally, entry also depends on the interaction 
between a potential entrant’s characteristics and those of the incumbent competitors.  The effect 
  1of competition on profitability also depends on the characteristics of both the potential entrant and 
the incumbents: domestic entrants prefer to compete with domestic incumbents, and are more 
sensitive to foreign competition than are foreign entrants.     
The following section reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on entry.  It also 
provides a brief description of the pharmaceutical industry and presents the rationale for 
examining market, firm, and product characteristics in this setting.  I explain the empirical model 
in Section III and the data in Section IV.  Section V presents the results, and Section VI 
concludes. 
II.  Background on entry and the pharmaceutical industry 
A.  The literature on entry 
A wealth of theoretical work exists on the welfare consequences of free entry when firms 
must incur fixed costs.  Many theories predict too little entry relative to the social optimum 
(Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)): the marginal entrant is welfare enhancing.  Others 
(von Weizäcker (1980), Perry (1984)) generate the opposite result, especially in homogenous 
product markets.  Then, an additional entrant reduces welfare by merely “business stealing” while 
incurring fixed costs.  Mankiw and Whinston (1986) demonstrate the conditions under which 
there is too much or too little entry.  In general, with imperfect competition, a fixed cost of entry, 
and homogeneous products, the marginal entrant decreases welfare, although this effect decreases 
as the fixed entry cost approaches zero.  But in settings where variety is important – so that the 
marginal entrant adds to product diversity – the welfare effects of entry are ambiguous.   
Accounting for the incentives to invest in innovation adds yet more complexity: it is necessary to 
compare the dynamic efficiency resulting from innovation with the static inefficiency of market 
power – and prices in excess of marginal cost – in the short run.  While this paper does not speak 
directly to the effects of entry on social welfare in pharmaceutical markets, more entry is likely to 
be welfare enhancing in this setting.
1
Several general findings emerge from the empirical literature on entry.  Both market size and 
the degree of competition influence the entry decision.  The number of firms in equilibrium 
increases at a decreasing rate with the size of the market, and profit margins fall as the number of 
competitors increases (Bresnahan and Reiss (1987, 1990, 1991), Berry (1992), Scott Morton 
                                                      
1 This is because different chemicals are not perfect substitutes for each other, so the benefit of an increase 
in product diversity probably exceeds the business stealing effect.  In addition, the costs of developing a 
drug for many markets are not much greater than the costs of developing a drug for a single market, so the 
fixed entry cost is relatively small for launch in any additional market.  Finally, the dynamic efficiency of 
innovation incentives is generally considered important for pharmaceuticals. 
  2(1999)).  Second, firms tend to enter in markets that are similar to those they already compete in.  
Berry (1992) shows airlines that serve one or both of the cities in a city pair market are more 
likely to enter that market (though this may reflect network effects rather than similarity).  Scott 
Morton (1999) demonstrates that generic drug firms in the US tend to enter product markets that 
match well to their existing products.  Finally, the match between a product and a market is 
important.  For example, Mazzeo (2002) finds that competing motels strategically differentiate 
themselves from each other in quality space to soften price competition.  All these studies of 
entry have the advantage of requiring little or no data on price and quantity, which is often 
expensive and difficult to obtain.  However, these authors relied on a single cross-section of 
markets, which precludes simultaneous consideration of market, firm, and product 
characteristics.
2
B.  Background and studies on the pharmaceutical industry 
Expenditures on health care range from 5% of GDP in South Korea to over 13% in the US, 
and the share of pharmaceutical sales in total health expenditures account for anywhere from 4% 
in the US to nearly 18% in France and Italy.  The US is the largest single market at $97 billion of 
annual revenue; the five largest European markets amount to $51 billion, as does Japan.
3  The 
importance of certain therapies can vary substantially across countries.  For example, nearly 22% 
of revenues in the US derive from drugs for the central nervous system, while in Japan this figure 
is only about 6%.  Italian expenditures on anti-infectives are over twice those of the UK.  These 
markets also differ on a number of other dimensions, of which regulation is the most notable.  
The entry of pharmaceuticals is restricted by the Food and Drug Administration in the US or an 
equivalent agency in other countries.  The price of drugs is also regulated in most countries, 
including four of the G7 markets.  For a more detailed description of price controls, see 
Jacobzone (2000) or Kyle (2005).   
The industry is highly fragmented: there are thousands of small firms around the world, only 
several hundred of which are research-based and have brought at least one drug to market.  About 
forty multinational firms dominate the market, and are responsible for half of all drugs available 
somewhere in the world.  Table 1 lists the number of firms in each major market, the number of 
drugs they have developed, and the average number of countries to which those drugs diffuse.  
The US is the origin of over a quarter of all drugs, and these products reach an average of about 
nine markets.  Though many drugs are invented in Japan, they are launched in fewer foreign 
                                                      
2 Toivanen and Waterson (2001) observe entry decisions over time into fast-food markets in the UK, but 
like Berry (1992), assume all heterogeneity is at the firm level. 
3 Figures are annual totals for 2000.  Source: IMS Health. 
  3markets.  Drugs with small domestic markets like Denmark, Switzerland, and the Netherlands 
spread to more foreign markets than drugs with large home markets.  Pharmaceutical firms tend 
to specialize in certain therapeutic categories,
4 and competition within therapies is relatively 
concentrated.  A new drug is reported to require an average of 7.1 years to develop at a cost of 
$500-600 million.
5  In 2000, pharmaceutical companies spent approximately $8 billion on sales 
and marketing and distributed samples worth an additional $7.95 billion in the US alone.
 6
Many prior studies on the pharmaceutical industry identify factors that should be important in 
the decision to launch a new drug.  Competition in pharmaceuticals exists both within a chemical 
(branded versus generic, prescription versus over-the-counter) and between different chemicals 
that treat the same condition.  The generic segment garners significant market share within a few 
years of patent expiration when entry occurs, but not all therapeutic classes (and very few 
countries) attract such entry.
7  While many have shown that generic competition has indisputable 
significance (at least in the US), there is substantial justification for focusing on competition 
between drugs.  Lichtenberg and Philipson (2002) estimate the loss in sales from entry by new 
drugs for the same therapeutic classification and find that entry by such drugs reduces the PDV of 
a drug by considerably more than generics.  These results are broadly consistent with other 
studies that emphasize the importance of intermolecular competition, such as Stern (1996) and 
Berndt et al. (1997).  In the context of a study on the diffusion of innovation, the creative 
destruction of intermolecular competition is more interesting than generic competition, which 
exists only for older drugs. 
In addition to competition, the regulatory environment has a significant bearing on prevailing 
prices (Danzon and Chao (2000a, 2000b)) and entry costs (Djankov et al. (2002)).  Countries with 
stringent regulation of entry combined with relatively little price regulation, such as the US and 
the UK, have highly concentrated domestic industries whose products diffuse more extensively 
into foreign markets (Thomas (1994)).  Parker (1984) shows regulation is related to large 
differences across countries in the number and mix of products introduced before 1978.  More 
recently, Kyle (2005), Danzon, Wang and Wang (2005), and Lanjouw (2005) all find evidence 
that price controls have deterred entry in pharmaceutical markets since the early 1980s.  Thus, 
there is much reason to expect regulation to influence entry. 
                                                      
4 For a breakdown of the top twenty firms’ specializations, see DiMasi (2000). 
5 Paraxel’s Pharmaceutical Statistical Sourcebook 1999, p. 49. 
6 IMS Health Inc. 
7 Generic competition in the US is the focus of Caves et al. (1991) and Grabowski and Vernon (1992), 
among others.  Hudson (2000) looks at the determinants of generic entry in the US, the UK, Germany, and 
Japan.  Ellison et al. (1997), who estimate demand for a class of antibiotics, and Berndt et al. (1997), who 
examine the antiulcer market, consider competition both within and between drugs.   
  4Regulation also affects drugs and firms differentially within a country, particularly in the 
costs of gaining regulatory approval (Dranove and Meltzer (1994), Carpenter (2003)).  Product 
characteristics, like therapeutic novelty or indication, and firm characteristics, such as experience 
with the FDA and domestic status, are related to the speed at which a new drug receives 
regulatory approval in the US.  Data from three other large pharmaceutical markets (the UK, 
France, and Germany) displays a similar pattern in time-to-market of important drugs, and reveals 
a strong home country advantage: the drugs of domestic firms are approved earlier than those of 
foreign firms.  Beyond the non-uniform effects of regulation, there is substantial evidence of 
significant firm and product heterogeneity in research productivity (Henderson and Cockburn 
(1996) and Cockburn and Henderson (1994, 1998)), and Scott Morton (1999) finds evidence of 
important firm-specific differences in the entry decisions of generic drug firms.  Firm-specific 
costs are therefore likely to be important in drug launches. 
III.  Model 
This paper assumes that potential entrants for a market take existing market structure as given and 
compete simultaneously in time t.  A drug is “at risk” for entry into all markets beginning in the 
year of its first launch into any country.  After launch in a market, it drops out of the risk set for 
that country.  Any drug that has been approved somewhere in the world for a particular 
therapeutic class is a potential entrant into that therapeutic class in all other countries.  This set 
excludes drugs currently under development for that therapeutic class, for which outcomes are 
uncertain and regulatory approval may be years away. 
A discrete-time hazard model corresponds to a static, reduced-form model of entry in which 
firms launch a new drug when they expect positive profits, and otherwise stay out of a market.  
Let i index drugs, j index firms, k index therapeutic classes, and l index countries.  A market is 
thus a class-country-year triple.  I estimate the following equation as a logit, where P(t) is the 
probability of a drug’s launch: 
α W γ Z β X θ M δ N a(t)
P(t) - 1
P(t)







This approach has the advantage of being flexible as well as accounting for right-censored 
observations, and its main purpose is descriptive.  However, it also requires several strong 
assumptions.  To include N as an explanatory variable, we must assume that one drug’s entry 
does not induce another’s exit.  The justification for such an assumption is provided in Section V.  
If M is included and treated as an exogenous variable, then the threat of future competition is 
allowed to affect current entry decisions, but one must believe that firms do not behave 
  5strategically by, for example, using entry in one country to deter a competitor’s launch in another.  
While firms in an oligopolistic setting (such as most drug markets) are likely to react to the 
behavior of their competitors, most firms in this industry have few drugs on the market and are 
active in a small number of countries.  For the large multinationals, with more multimarket 
contact, this assumption may be more problematic. 
An alternative to the discrete-time logit is a continuous-time hazard model.  Since drug 
launches are observed at annual intervals in this dataset, a discrete-time model is probably most 
appropriate.  As the interval of observation becomes small, the results from a discrete-time logit 
converge to those from a proportional hazard model,
8  and the results from a continuous-time 
hazard model are similar to the discrete-time results presented here.   
Despite the strong and sometimes uncomfortable assumptions necessary, estimating a static 
reduced-form model can provide insights into the sources of unobserved heterogeneity that may 
inform future research.  In particular, these models are numerically stable and robust enough to 
estimate a large number of coefficients and fixed effects, which is a far greater challenge in a 
structural setting such as that of Berry (1992).  The estimation here offers several advantages over 
previous work.  The set of potential entrants is clear, so the dependent variable is reliably defined.  
Unlike most previous studies, which use a single cross-section, the panel structure of this dataset 
permits a richer set of controls.  It is also one of few studies to focus on the entry patterns of 
highly R&D-intensive products, the management of which is likely to be quite different from 
single-outlet, local firms with relatively undifferentiated products. 
IV.  Data 
I obtained information on all drugs developed between 1980 and 2000 from the 
Pharmaprojects database, which is maintained by the UK consulting firm PJB Publications.  This 
dataset includes the drug’s chemical and brand names, the name and nationality of the firm that 
developed it, the identity of licensees, the country and year in which it was patented, its status (in 
clinical trials, registered, or launched) in the 28 largest pharmaceutical markets, and the year of 
launch where applicable.  Each drug is assigned to up to six therapeutic classes.  The system of 
classification used by Pharmaprojects is adapted from the European Pharmaceutical Market 
Research Association; there are 17 broad disease areas (for example, dermatological conditions) 
and 199 more specific classes (such as antipsoriasis treatments).  The sample of drugs used in this 
research is restricted to those that are new chemical or molecular entities by dropping new 
formulations of existing products, OTC licensing opportunities, antidotes, and diagnostic agents.   
                                                      
8 See Amemiya (1985), pp. 433-455, or Allison (1984) for a more complete discussion of duration models. 
  6I examine entry into only the G7 markets, which account for about 70% of total 
pharmaceutical revenue.  Entry incentives should be greatest for these large markets, and other 
important factors, such as patent law, are relatively uniform across this subset.  This permits a 
closer examination of the role of firm characteristics in the entry decision, without worrying as 
much about differences across countries that are important, but often unobserved or difficult to 
quantify. 
The OECD Health Data 2000 dataset provides population, GDP, data on access to health 
care, and other demographic information for the G7 markets considered here.  The regulatory 
structure of each country is classified as “price control regime” using the summary tables from 
Jacobzone’s “Pharmaceutical Policies in OECD Countries: Reconciling Social and Industrial 
Goals.”  Canada, France, Italy, and Japan are price-controlled countries; the US, UK, and 
Germany do not use explicit price controls. 
A market is defined as a country-therapeutic class-year triple.  This definition assumes that 
drugs with the same therapeutic classification are substitutes, and that there is no substitution 
between therapeutic classes.  In addition, this market definition requires that there be no trade in 
unapproved products across international borders: launching a drug in the US must not enable 
access to the Canadian market.  While the move to a common market in Europe weakens the 
assumption of separate markets, negotiation with health ministries is still necessary for the drug 
to be reimbursed.  Competition from drugs approved in nearby countries but without local 
insurance coverage is probably weak.
9
Unfortunately, while I have information on when a drug is launched in a country and what 
therapeutic classes it is approved for somewhere in the world, I do not know which therapeutic 
classes a drug is approved for in each country.  Therefore, I assume that when the drug is 
launched in a country, it is a competitor in all of its therapeutic classes, but entry into each 
therapeutic class is not a separate or independent decision.  For this reason, for each drug-country 
pair, I use only one entry equation (for its primary therapeutic class), but treat the drug as a 
competitor in all its therapeutic areas once launched.
10  In general, exit is rare, since a drug may 
continue to be an important therapy even after its patent expires, especially in nations without a 
significant generic segment.  While a firm may reduce its advertising efforts for a particular drug, 
it generally does not withdraw the product from a market.  It is therefore assumed that there is no 
                                                      
9 There is evidence that “gray market” trade in pharmaceuticals across borders has been increasing, 
however.  See OECD Joint Group on Trade and Competition (2001). 
10 I experimented with (1) treating a drug as a competitor/potential entrant in only its primary therapeutic 
class and (2) using a non-primary therapeutic class for the entry decision (which changes the values only of 
the competition and class fixed effect variables).  The results were almost identical. 
  7exit for economic reasons.
11  Possible obsolescence is controlled for in the estimation by allowing 
older drugs to have a different impact on entry than newer therapies. 
Drug quality, or the therapeutic advance a treatment represents, is likely an important factor 
in both the fixed costs of entry (if regulators accelerate approval of breakthrough therapies, or if 
regulatory approval is more difficult to obtain for a novel type of therapy with which regulators 
are unfamiliar) and in variable profits.  Unfortunately, objective measures of quality are difficult 
to obtain.  Previous studies have used the ratings of therapeutic novelty assigned by the FDA 
upon application for approval, but these are unavailable for drugs that did not seek entry into the 
US.  The “Essential Drug List” of the World Health Organization is another possibility, but it is 
updated infrequently and most of the drugs on the list are more than twenty years old.  Therefore, 
I follow Dranove and Meltzer (1994) in using Medline citations; the construction of variables 
using citations is described in the Appendix.  Other aspects of drug quality are the number and 
severity of adverse interactions and side effects, dosage form, and dosage frequency.  Systematic 
data on these characteristics is unavailable, particularly for drugs not marketed in the US.
12   
Quantifying the regulatory barrier to entry, as well as the severity of price regulation, is 
nearly impossible.  One indication is the time between application and approval of a drug.   
However, not only is this unavailable in all markets, but is also likely to be a function of drug 
quality, firm characteristics, the number of other drugs under review, and perhaps the decisions of 
regulators in other countries, and is therefore an imperfect measure.  Other omitted variables 
include the importance of generic competition within a country (or therapeutic class), the degree 
to which marketing of pharmaceuticals is regulated, the cost of marketing in each country, 
heterogeneity in prescribing behavior, and other subtle but important distinctions between 
countries.  These effects are subsumed in the country fixed effects included in some 
specifications, with the unfortunate implication that the estimated fixed effect for each country is 
the net impact of many variables. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for data used in estimation.  The sample contains 1482 
unique molecules produced by 286 firms in 134 therapeutic classifications, for a total of 13445 
country-class-year markets.  There were 86755 entry opportunities, only 3445 (4%) of which had 
a product launch.  The mean number of drugs competing in markets with entry opportunities is 
1.8.  Figure 1 shows the distribution across therapeutic classes within several countries over 
                                                      
11 However, Lichtenberg and Philipson present evidence that 18% of the drugs approved between 1970 and 
1979 in the US are no longer marketed in 1999. 
12 Reported adverse interactions and contraindications can be obtained for drugs launched in the US.   
Results are largely unchanged by including these measures of quality in regressions using the subset of the 
data for which this information was collected.  
  81980-2000.  Most markets are highly concentrated, and over one-fourth have no entry at all.  
Remarkably, over 28% of all potential markets are empty in the US, even though it accounts for 
twice the revenues of Japan and Europe.  The large fraction of “0” markets reflects both that some 
drugs are never launched in a country and that some drugs are only introduced years after they 
first become available elsewhere.  However, even as of 2000, 15% of markets are empty.  On 
average, it takes about 3.4 years after a new treatment is first launched elsewhere for an empty 
market to experience its first entrant (see Table 3), and another 4 years after that for a second 
drug to enter the market.  This suggests rather large welfare consequences related to launch 
delays, but there is quite a bit of variance around these numbers, and systematic patterns are 
difficult to identify.  Figure 2 shows the launch pattern for the average drug: it is clear that the 
probability of additional G7 launches after one year is rather low, and the average drug is only in 
2 of the G7 markets. 
Variables measured at the drug-year level include age, the number of countries in which the 
drug has been introduced, and its importance as measured by its share of total Medline citations 
within its therapeutic class.  The probability of entry is expected to be concave in the number of 
launch countries if there are economies of scale in global production, as clinical trial data is 
accumulated and used in subsequent applications, or if regulators are exposed to less political risk 
in approving a drug that has already been accepted by their counterparts in other countries.  A 
positive coefficient is expected on the importance measure, either because important drugs are 
more profitable or because regulators respond to political pressures and approve them more 
quickly. 
Several firm-level variables are included.  A firm with a presence in many markets may have 
more resources to draw on, which would make entry more likely.  The dummy variable 
“multinational” (defined here as a firm active in at least 10 countries) captures this effect.  A 
firm’s experience in a country is defined as the count of drugs it markets in that country, and an 
alternative measure, “experience years” (equal to the number of years a firm has been active in 
the country), is also used.  These capture economies of scope: experience with the regulator, firm 
reputation, and the presence of a detailing force and distribution channels may be spread across 
all a firm’s products within a country.  The number of drugs a firm has within a country-class 
market measures expertise in the local market. 
All firm variables apply to the innovating firm, which may license a drug to another firm for 
marketing in particular countries.  If licensing were efficient, then only the firm portfolio 
variables should matter, as an innovating firm might choose not to license out a drug that could 
cannibalize sales of its other products.  The other characteristics of the innovating firm, in 
  9particular the firm-country interactions, would be irrelevant.  To the extent that licensing markets 
work well, this specification is biased against finding any significance on most firm-level 
variables.  
Three additional dummy variables capture similarities between the country of headquarters of 
the originating firm and the target country; these indicate whether the headquarters country shares 
a border, language, or regulatory structure with the potential market.  Firms may prefer to enter 
markets that share characteristics with their home market, with which they are likely to be most 
familiar.  This could stem from a better understanding of neighboring culture, easier 
communication, or familiarity with regulations.  (Sharing a border may also be related to lower 
transportation costs, though in the case of pharmaceuticals such costs are usually trivial.)  If labor 
markets were completely efficient, a firm could hire managers with the necessary language skills 
or experience in the target country; in this case, the coefficients on these variables should be zero. 
I believe that drugs are not homogeneous products, which would suggest that competition 
from drugs that are closer substitutes would have more of an effect on profits.  The characteristics 
of competing firms may also affect profits if, for example, an incumbent has a particularly large 
sales force or is favored by physicians for some reason.  Several (admittedly crude) measures of 
competition are used in the estimation to allow for the possibility that drugs or firms may have 
asymmetric effects on their competitors’ profits.  These include the number of “old” incumbent 
drugs (those launched more than 5 years ago), the number of “new” incumbents, the number of 
incumbent drugs made by domestic firms and the number made by foreign firms.   
Finally, country-level demographics provide rough measures of market size and demand.  
Ideally, incidence rates at the level of country-class would be included, but these are difficult to 
obtain and may also be endogenous if pharmaceuticals reduce the occurrence of disease.  In 
general, additional country-level variables such as the number of doctors per capita, 
pharmaceutical spending, and life expectancy proved insignificant
13 and so only a parsimonious 
set of variables is presented here.  Specifications that include country-therapeutic class fixed 
effects control for other unobserved market characteristics. 
                                                      
13 This is likely because what these variables measure is unclear.  A long life expectancy may indicate good 
health, but does this reflect low demand (healthy people don’t need drugs, so little entry) or is it the result 
of available treatments (lots of entry)?  In addition, once demeaned by country and year, these measures 
have little variation. 
  10V.  Results 
Tables 4-6 present results of discrete-time logit duration models.  All specifications include 
drug age, year, and therapeutic class fixed effects, the coefficients of which are not reported; 
Models 3-6 include country-therapeutic class interactions. 
Table 4 displays the parameter estimates for market characteristics (note: Models 4 and 5 
include alternative measures of competition, the coefficients for which are presented in Table 6).  
Models 1 and 2, which do not include country fixed effects, are most useful for examining the 
effect of country-level characteristics.  All of the countries in the sample are large and relatively 
wealthy, so perhaps it is not surprising that population and per capita GDP are not especially 
important determinants of entry for this set.
14  In the specification that includes only country 
characteristics, the coefficients on population and its square have the expected signs, but the 
coefficient on GDP is not statistically different from zero.  However, the use of price controls 
appears to discourage entry once firm characteristics are controlled for (Model 2).  At the median 
of all continuous variables, price controls decrease the probability of entry by about 21%. 
The parameter estimates for variables capturing the extent of competition in Models 1-3 
demonstrate the consequences of mismeasuring market size.  The probability of entry appears to 
be increasing in the number of current competitors in Model 1, which controls only for year and 
therapeutic class effects.  Such an interpretation overlooks the fact that the number of drugs in a 
market reflects underlying country-specific demand for a therapy, which is inadequately captured 
by population and wealth.  As an example, consider lafutidine, a new antiulcer medication 
developed by a Belgian company, which was launched in Japan but not in the US.  While quite a 
large market in both countries, Japan already had 18 antiulcer treatments, compared to 9 in the 
US.  However, the Japanese have a much higher rate of stomach cancers and other 
gastrointestinal disorders,
15 so demand for antiulcer drugs is especially large relative to other 
countries.  Without accounting for the difference in demand for antiulcer treatments between 
these two countries, one would erroneously conclude that entry is more likely in markets with 
more competition.   
If country-therapeutic class interactions are included, as in Model 3, the coefficients on the 
various measures of competition are negative and significant.  Competition from older drugs 
appears to have a greater impact than that of more recently introduced products, perhaps because 
brand-name capital takes time to develop or because doctors have “sticky” prescribing habits.  
                                                      
14 Market size and wealth have much greater effects when estimated on a sample of countries with more 
variance.  See Kyle (2003). 
15 Source: Merck Manual. 
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the decline in expected profits is steeper when the number of competing drugs is low.  This is to 
be expected: if each drug takes 1/N of the market, where N is the number of drugs, then moving 
from monopoly to duopoly typically entails a greater drop in per-firm profits than the difference 
between nine and ten competitors.   
It should be noted that these results are also consistent with unobserved heterogeneity in the 
fixed costs of entry across firms where the order of entry into a market is determined by fixed 
costs.  In other words, the 10
th entrant takes longer to get into the market not because profits are 
being competed away, but because the 10
th entrant has higher fixed costs than the 5
th, for 
example.  Markets with many potential competitors experience more entry, which is consistent 
with the hypothesis that firms have heterogeneous costs.  Such markets get more idiosyncratic 
draws from the distribution of firm fixed costs and therefore experience more actual entry in 
expectation. 
Table 5 displays parameter estimates for firm and product characteristics included in Models 
2-5.  These coefficients are fairly robust across all specifications.  Profits appear to be concave in 
the number of countries in which a drug has been launched.  This result is consistent with firms 
introducing their products first in the most profitable countries, and with economies of scope 
from clinical trials or other data required for regulatory approval common to many countries.  The 
probability of entry is increasing in its importance: the larger a drug’s share of the citations in its 
therapeutic class, the more likely its launch.   
More interestingly, the diffusion of a new drug depends largely on the characteristics of its 
originator.  The percentage of correct predictions of entry increases from 31% to 58% when firm 
characteristics and interactions with market characteristics are included for models without 
country-class fixed effects, and from 51% to 64% for models with them.  Experience in a country 
increases the likelihood of entry.  On average, marketing three additional drugs in a country or an 
additional three years of marketing any drug in a country offsets the effect of competing with one 
additional drug.  This suggests economies of scope in local distribution through familiarity with 
the regulator or the establishment of marketing and distribution forces, as well as firm reputation 
built up over many years of marketing in a country.  However, it is impossible in this model to 
distinguish whether the firm has exogenously low fixed costs in a given country, and therefore 
introduces more products, or whether it achieves lower costs through economies of scope.  Entry 
is less likely if the firm has a larger number of drugs in its portfolio or if it already markets a drug 
in the same country-therapeutic class market; these effects are of little economic significance. 
  12Particularly striking is the importance of domestic status, even after measures of market 
experience are included.  The probability of launch in the home country of the firm is 3.4 times 
greater than the average.  A firm may have relatively low fixed costs in its domestic market for 
many reasons; perhaps it receives some favoritism by the local regulator, is allowed more 
generous pricing in the interest of keeping the domestic industry strong, or enjoys superior 
marketing ability in its native environment.  Alternatively, domestic firms may be most familiar 
with the therapeutic needs of their home country, and therefore concentrate their drug 
development in those areas.  Japanese firms have developed many of the antiulcer treatments 
available today in response to the local demand for such products, to continue with the example 
used earlier.   
Similarities between a firm’s home market and the target country seem to matter for the entry 
decision.  Sharing a border and a language increases the probability of entry by 53% at the 
median of all continuous variables based on the estimates from Model 2, though the effect of a 
common regulatory structure is not estimated precisely.
16  In other words, these similarities 
provide almost half of the advantages associated with domestic status.  These effects are present 
even for multinational firms.  In specifications that include interactions of the multinational 
dummy with all other variables (not included to save space), the effect of a shared language or 
border for multinationals is one-third to one-half the size of the coefficient for small local firms, 
but still large and significant.  The estimated home country advantage for multinationals is about 
41% the size of that for local firms.  Thus, even the largest pharmaceutical firms with a global 
presence prefer to stay as to close to home, in some sense, as possible.  These effects are 
illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the predicted probability of entry for foreign firms with no 
shared language or border, multinational firms, “similar” firms, and domestic firms over the range 
of continuous firm-level variables and at the median of all market-level variables. 
If firms have very different fixed costs of entry across markets, do they also have different 
impacts on the variable profits of their competitors?  Some suggestive evidence of asymmetric 
competitive effects is provided in Table 8. Models 4 separates competition from domestic and 
foreign incumbents, and Model 5 includes interactions of these competition measures with the 
                                                      
16 The importance of some variables differs from country to country.  Results for specifications estimated 
by a drug’s country of origin are available from the author, and are summarized as follows.  The 
coefficients on domestic status in Italy and Japan are significantly larger than those for other countries.  
The effect of similarities in regulatory structure becomes clearer.  Swiss, French, and Italian firms seek 
launch in free-pricing countries with a different regulatory structure than their home markets.  US and UK 
firms, whose domestic markets lack price controls, seem to prefer similar free-pricing markets, and shared 
language or borders matter much less.  However, examining this limited set of countries does mean that the 
coefficients on the “common” variables are driven by a small number of country-pairs and should be 
interpreted with some caution.   
  13characteristics of the potential entrant.  From Model 4, it appears that foreign incumbents have a 
more negative effect on variable profits than do domestic firms.  This makes intuitive sense given 
the earlier results: if foreign firms face higher entry costs, then those that manage to enter 
probably do so with particularly high-quality drugs.  However, not all potential entrants are 
affected the same way.  The results from Model 5 indicate that domestic firms are far less 
affected by competition from other domestic firms than from foreign firms.  There are a number 
of possible explanations for this pattern.  If the set of drugs from foreign firms that are launched 
in a country is of higher quality than the set of drugs from domestic firms, then we might expect 
firms to differentiate strategically, as in Mazzeo (2002).  This would imply that domestic firms 
would prefer to compete with foreign drugs and vice versa, to segment the market.  However, 
especially in price-controlled countries, high quality drugs may not be permitted to charge higher 
prices, and such market segmentation may be impossible.  Under those conditions, it is 
reasonable that the sales of lower quality drugs are more affected by the presence of many high 
quality competitors.  The presence of many domestic incumbents may also be correlated with a 
regulator that favors domestic firms, so that many domestic incumbents signals especially low 
entry barriers to a domestic potential entrant.  Alternatively, domestic firms may find it easier to 
collude with each other than with foreign firms.  Addressing that possibility is beyond the scope 
of this paper, but may be interesting future research. 
VI.  Conclusion 
This paper integrates predictions of economic theory with the views of strategic management 
in considering the relative impacts of firm and market characteristics on the entry patterns of 
pharmaceuticals.  I find that expected profits decline in the number of competitors provided that 
market-specific demand is controlled for.  Thus, results are consistent with predictions of 
industrial organization oligopoly models and the findings of previous studies of entry.  Price 
controls are estimated to have a negative effect on entry, and drug characteristics are related to 
profits in expected ways.  In addition, there is evidence of economies of scale in global 
production and economies of scope within a market.  Firm characteristics, such as experience in a 
country and domestic status, are found to have an enormous bearing on the diffusion of a new 
drug.  
While both market structure and firm/product characteristics have substantial effects on the 
entry pattern of a new drug, this research demonstrates that the interaction between them is 
crucial.  Similarities between a firm’s home market and a potential launch market greatly increase 
the probability of launch; a common border and language provides about half the advantage of 
  14domestic status.  In addition, the effect of incumbents on the launch decision of a potential entrant 
depends in part on whether both are domestic or have different origins.  This is an important 
dimension of entry that most previous research has been unable to address. 
There are several important implications for public policy from this research.  The 
characteristics of most pharmaceutical markets point towards “too little” entry, so an 
understanding of the impediments to launch is important.  For example, price controls appear to 
reduce the probability of a new drug’s entry.  The costs of deterring existing products, over and 
above the possible long-run effects on incentives to invest in costly R&D and the development of 
future products, should be balanced against any short-run savings from lower prices.  Second, 
these results demonstrate that domestic firms are able to access their local markets at a lower cost 
than are foreign firms.  While it is possible that local firms develop treatments for local needs 
more efficiently than foreign firms, an industrial policy that favors the drugs of domestic firms 
may result in crowding out of superior foreign products.  This research also demonstrates the 
importance of understanding local pharmaceutical markets.  The match between an innovating 
firm and the local market appears to be a critical aspect of profitability.  The findings suggest that 
there are gains from licensing to domestic firms or to firms with a large presence in a market.   
These results indicate that there are important sources of competitive advantage that merit 
additional exploration.  More information about pharmaceutical firms, such as their financial 
health, their patenting activities, and their licensing practices, would be very valuable.  Future 
work should also incorporate better measures of country-specific demand and costs associated 
with product launch, such as indicators of regulatory stringency and advertising. Lastly, a 
structural approach that addresses the problem of endogenous entry by competitors and examines 
the nature of competition in these markets may be appropriate. 
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Table 1: Origin and diffusion of pharmaceuticals 
Country  Number of firms Number of drugs Avg # countries in 
which launched 
USA  83 420  8.9 
Japan  71 301  4.4 
France  14 195  7.3 
Germany  21 147  6.9 
UK  17 128  9.2 
Switzerland  11 110  9.5 
Italy  33 100  4.5 
Spain  13 37  2.7 
Netherlands  5 36  8.1 
South Korea  5 18  1.2 
Denmark  3 17  13.3 
Canada  6 8  6.0 
Norway  1 8  9.0 
Belgium  2 7  8.3 
Hungary  2 7  5.7 
Finland  1 6  6.0 
Sweden  6 6  6.3 
Argentina  3 5  2.2 
Australia  2 5  3.0 
Czech Republic  2 3  9.0 
Austria  2 2  1.0 
Israel  1 2  5.5 
Brazil  1 1  1.0 
Croatia  1 1 15.0 
Cuba  1 1  2.0 
Ireland  1 1  1.0 
New Zealand  1 1  1.0 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Number of drugs  1482 
Number of firms  286 
Number of therapeutic classes  134 
Years covered  1980-1999 
Number of markets (country-class-year observations)  13445 
Number of entry opportunities (drug-country-class-year 
observations) 
86755 
Number of entry events  3445 
Frequency Variable  Definition  Obs  Mean  Std 
Dev 
Min Max 
Drug importance  Drug's share of stock of Medline  
citations for class  18914  0.01  0.07  0  1 
Age  Number of years since drug's first 
launch anywhere  18914  8.26  5.17  0  15 
Drug-year 
Number of countries 
launched in 
 
  18914 5.40 5.91  0  27 
Firm  Multinational  Firm has launched drugs in 10+ 
countries 286  0.33  0.47  0  1 
Firm-year  Portfolio  Total number of firm's drugs  4034 5.03 8.94  1  81 
Domestic firm  1982 0.11 0.31  0  1 
Common language  1982 0.12 0.33  0  1 




All refer to the firm’s country of  
headquarters and the target country
1982 0.36 0.48  0  1 
Country experience  Count of firm's other drugs  
launched in country  23538 1.64 4.48  0  51 
Country-class 
experience 
Count of firm's drugs in country- 




Experience years  Number of years firm has  
marketed in country  23538  4.07  6.99  0  40 
Country  Price controls  Country uses price controls  7 0.43 0.53  0  1 
Population  Population in 10s of millions  140 9.16 7.03  2.45  27.29  Country-
year  GDP per capita  GDP per capita in US$1000s  140 17.09  5.20 7.84 31.94 
Number of new 
drugs in market 
Count of drugs in market launched
less than 5 years ago  13445  1.75  1.89  0  14 
Number of old drugs 
in market 
Count of drugs in market launched
more than 5 years ago  13445  2.88  3.84  0  34 
Number of potential 
competitors 
Count of drugs launched in class  
elsewhere in the world  13445 9.49 8.37  1  66 
Number of domestic 
drugs in market 
Count of drugs in market launched
by firms headquartered in country 13445  1.15  1.86  0  18 
Country-
class-year 
Number of foreign 
drugs in market 
Count of drugs in market launched
by firms headquartered in country 13445  3.63  3.97  0  30 
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Table 3: Years between launches in a country-therapeutic class market 
 
  Years since last entry event 
Entry order  Mean   Std. Dev. 
1 3.43  4.20 
2 4.01  3.83 
3 2.81  2.84 
4 2.35  2.53 
5 2.08  2.10 
6 2.00  2.16 
7 1.43  1.58 
8 1.67  1.62 
9 1.30  1.64 
10 0.96  1.34 
 
The first entry event in a market occurs an average of 3.43 years after the drug is first launched elsewhere, the 
second entry event occurs an average of 4.01 years after the first entry, etc.
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Table 4: Parameter Estimates for Market Characteristics 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 

























Observations Used    80300  80300  80300  80300  80300 
Log Likelihood   -11894.1431  -10328.8186  -9660.9739  -9674.7924  -9666.2711 
Percent of correct no-entry outcomes  96.04  96.26  96.51  96.51  96.51 
Percent of correct entry outcomes  30.56  57.07  64.18  63.94 
 
65.73 
  0.066**      0.090** -.155** Number of new drugs in market 
 (0.023)   (0.024)   (0.029)     
0.000   0.000   0.008*      N new drugs squared 
 (0.002)   (0.003)   (0.003)     
0.034*          0.046** -.224** Number of old drugs in market 
 (0.015)   (0.016)   (0.022)     
-.001   -.001   0.004**      N old drugs squared 
 (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)     
-.013**          -.016** 0.056** 0.051** 0.050** Number of potential competitors 
 (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006) 
0.065**  0.041*  -.122   -.120   -.119   Population (10s of millions) 
 (0.016)   (0.018)   (0.094)   (0.094)   (0.094) 
-.002*            -.001 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** Population squared 
 (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
-.038   -.081**  -.041   -.063   -.061   GDP per capita ($1000s) 
 (0.020)   (0.021)   (0.040)   (0.041)   (0.042) 
-.046   -.214**  -.320*  -.219   -.229   Price controls 
 (0.042)   (0.045)   (0.163)   (0.161)   (0.161) 
* = significant at the 5% level, ** = significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates for Firm Characteristics 
   Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 






















Observations Used   80300  80300  80300  80300 
Log Likelihood   -10328.8186  -9660.9739  -9674.7924  -9666.2711 
Percent of correct no-entry outcomes   96.26  96.51  96.51  96.51 
Percent of correct entry outcomes  57.07  64.18  63.94  65.73 
0.020** 0.014*  0.013*  0.014*  Country experience 
 (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006) 
0.020** 0.013** 0.013** 0.013**  Experience years 
 (0.004)   (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.005) 
-0.031   -0.052   -0.052   -0.073*  Country-class experience 
 (0.030)   (0.032)   (0.032)   (0.032) 
-0.015** -0.010** -0.009** -0.009**  Portfolio 
 (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003) 
1.297** 1.232** 1.261** 1.253**  Drug importance 
 (0.245)   (0.265)   (0.265)   (0.265) 
0.436** 0.468** 0.468** 0.468**  Number of countries launched in 
 (0.015)   (0.016)   (0.016)   (0.016) 
-0.012** -0.012** -0.012** -0.012**  Number of countries launched in 
squared   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
0.326** 0.398** 0.394** 0.398**  Multinational firm 
 (0.075)   (0.079)   (0.079)   (0.079) 
1.664** 1.981** 1.992** 2.053**  Domestic firm 
 (0.064)   (0.076)   (0.076)   (0.107) 
0.347** 0.606** 0.608** 0.609**  Common language 
 (0.066)   (0.079)   (0.079)   (0.079) 
0.230**  0.072   0.070   0.056   Common border 
 (0.064)   (0.075)   (0.074)   (0.075) 
0.010   -0.087   -0.084   -0.091   Common regulatory structure 
 (0.046)   (0.051)   (0.051)   (0.051) 
* = significant at the 5% level, ** = significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6: Parameter Estimates for Domestic vs. Foreign Competition 
   Model 4  Model 5 












Observations Used   80300  80300 
Log Likelihood   -9674.7924  -9666.2711 
Percent of correct no-entry outcomes   96.51  96.51 
Percent of correct entry outcomes  63.94  65.73 
-0.098** -0.110**  Number of domestic incumbents 
 (0.024)   (0.025) 
-0.138** -0.131**  Number of foreign incumbents 
 (0.013)   (0.013) 
 0.086**  Number of domestic incumbents 
*Domestic entrant     (0.027) 
 -0.057**  Number of foreign incumbents 
*Domestic entrant     (0.016) 
* = significant at the 5% level, ** = significant at the 1% level. 
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Figure 2: Launch patterns by age of drug 
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Probabilities are calculated at the mean of all market-level variables. 
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Appendix: Construction of variables using MEDLINE citation data. 
  
The description of MEDLINE from the National Library of Medicine website is as 
follows: 
MEDLINE is the NLM's premier bibliographic database covering the 
fields of medicine, nursing, dentistry, veterinary medicine, the health 
care system, and the preclinical sciences.   MEDLINE contains 
bibliographic citations and author abstracts from more than 4,000 
biomedical journals published in the United States and 70 other 
countries. The file contains over 11 million citations dating back to the 
mid-1960s. Coverage is worldwide, but most records are from English-
language sources or have English abstracts. 
 
  All MEDLINE citations that were classified as a clinical trial, meta-analysis, practice 
guideline, or randomized controlled trial, and pertained to humans, were downloaded from the 
National Library of Medicine website (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/PubMed/) for 1965 through 
2000, a total of 307,527 articles.  To match the drugs in Pharmaprojects to the Medline data, the 
drug’s generic name, chemical name, and its synonyms (such as brand names in different 
countries) were located in the title and abstract of citations, resulting in 764,384 drug mentions.    
For 81% of drug mentions, there is a field for the affiliation of the lead author; the geographic 
locations of the lead authors were identified from this field for all but ~1% of these mentions. 
     
“Global drug importance” is defined as a drug’s share of the stock of drug mentions for 
its therapeutic class from articles by foreign authors.  The stock was computed using 5, 10, and 
15% rates of depreciation; the results from the regression analysis are robust to the assumed rate 
(15% is the rate used for the reported results).  The most class citations pertain to anticancers, 
anti-infectives, and antidiabetics.  Not surprisingly, the anti-AIDS/anti-HIV therapeutic classes 
account for an increasing share of citations over time (about 10% in 2000). 
 
In using this data, one must assume that a drug’s importance is positively correlated with 
the number of studies and publications that refer to it, and that Medline’s coverage is not biased 
towards a particular country.  There are several unavoidable weaknesses.  The measure of 
importance might reflect not therapeutic value but safety concerns, if a potentially dangerous drug 
is the subject of more studies.   Large pharmaceutical firms may have more resources to devote to 
the funding of clinical trials that are published in Medline journals, thus biasing “importance” 
towards larger firms.  Although the Medline database includes publications from more than 100 
countries, its coverage is most complete for English-language journals, which could lead to an 
upward bias for the importance of drugs from English-speaking nations.  Finally, it is possible 
that the search algorithm misses mentions of drugs in abstracts that are not in English or finds 
fewer matches if abstracts from non-English articles are often unavailable.  These shortcomings 
are acknowledged, but alternative objective measures of drug importance are few. 
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